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CASE NOTE
PUTTING THE TEETH BACK INTO THE BFOQ REQUIREMENT
OF TITLE VII AND THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT:
INTERNATIONAL UNION v. JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.
In a resounding victory for women's and workers' rights, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has found that a Wisconsin battery manufacturer, in bar-
ring women without proof of infertility from jobs involving exposure to
lead, violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's recent ruling in International
Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.2 has the potential to impact women's
access to an estimated twenty million industrial jobs.3 In addition, the
decision re-establishes the role and effect that both Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
of 1978 ("PDA")5 were intended to fulfill in protecting women against
discrimination in the workplace.
This Casenote explores the status of fetal protection policies before
Johnson Controls and the possible ramifications this decision may have
on both employers and employees. Specifically, section two discusses the
applicable statutory language of Title VII and the PDA.' Section three
addresses how the courts interpreted and applied these statutes to fetal
protection policies prior to Johnson Controls.7 Section four analyzes the
Johnson Controls decision itself." Finally, section five forecasts the prob-
able impact that this decision may have on current employment prac-
1. Kary L. Moss, A Victory for Choice, 13 NAT'L L.J., April 8, 1991, at 13, col. 1.
2. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
3. Moss, supra note 1. The impact will most likely be two-fold: women will no longer be
forced to choose between working and having children, and employers will be forced to clean
up hazardous workplaces rather than shut out workers most vulnerable to their vices. Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
5. Id. § 2000e(k).
6. See infra notes 10-25 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 26-53 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 54-97 and accompanying text.
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tices.9 Overall, this Casenote shows that, in striking down Johnson Con-
trols' fetal protection policy, the Supreme Court has finally put the teeth
back into legislation whose goal was to provide equal employment oppor-
tunities for women.
II. TITLE VII AND THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
Fetal protection policies are employment requirements that remove or
exclude fertile or pregnant women from jobs in which the working envi-
ronment is considered to be hazardous to a woman's reproductive health
or to an unborn fetus.' ° The dispute engendered by fetal protection poli-
cies centers on the difficulty in reconciling the discriminatory effect of
such policies and the principles underlying specific congressional legisla-
tion aimed at eliminating unjustified sex discrimination in the
workplace."'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.12 Pursuant to Title VII, overt discrimination includes any employ-
ment policy that intentionally discriminates against certain employees on
the basis of these specifically prohibited classifications. An employer's
mere act of implementing such a policy establishes the requisite discrimi-
natory intent."3 In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by adding the Preg-
9. See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
10. United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 875-76 (7th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991). For further discussion of fetal protection policies in the em-
ployment context, see George M. Sullivan & William A. Nowlin, Gender-Based Fetal Pro-
tection Policies: Impermissible Sex Discrimination, 12 LAB. L.J. 387 (1991); Howard A. Si-
mon, Fetal Protection Policies After Johnson Controls: No Easy Answers, 15 EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS L.J. 491 (1990); Patricia E. Pierman, Fetal Protection Policies and Title VII, 11
LAB. L.J. 810 (1990); Margaret Post Duncan, Fetal Protection Policies: Furthering Sex Dis-
crimination in the Marketplace, 28 J. FAM. L. 727 (1990).
11. Hannah A. Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments, The
Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
66 IowA L. REv. 63, 77 (1980).
12. Section 703(a) of Title VII reads:
(a) Employer Practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
13. Barbara J. Naretto, Note, Employment Discrimination Made Easy: Fetal Protection
Policies, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 441, 451 (1990). This author explains:
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nancy Discrimination Act 4 to ensure that employment distinctions re-
lated to a woman's childbearing capabilities would also be considered per
se violations of Title VII.15 Due to the passage of the PDA, discrimination
based on pregnancy or the capacity to bear children constitutes prima
facie gender-based discrimination. Consequently, a woman may show a
[T]he denial of privileges, as illustrated by the language of the employer's policy, may
be based on the employee's religion, race, sex, national origin, and ... pregnancy. In
an overt discrimination claim, the employee alleges that the employer's motive in
initiating the policy is discriminatory. However, the employer's very act of imple-
menting a policy based on prohibited factors under Title VII establishes his discrimi-
natory intent or motive.
Id. at 451 (citing Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)).
14. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides in pertinent part:
[T]he terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" [in Title VII] include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
15. In its report, the House Committee on Education and Labor noted that the PDA
clarifies Congress' intent that pregnancy-based discrimination be prohibited in the work-
place. See PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PREGNANCY, H.R. REP. No. 948,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749. The Committee wrote:
This legislation would clearly establish that the prohibition against sex discrimina-
tion in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes a prohibition against em-
ployment-related discrimination on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. As an amendment to Title VII, this bill will apply to all aspects of
employment - hiring, reinstatement, termination, disability benefits, sick leave,
medical benefits, seniority and other conditions of employment currently covered by
Title VII. Pregnancy-based distinctions will be subject to the same scrutiny on the
same terms as other acts of sex discrimination proscribed in the existing statute.
Id. at 4752.
Additionally, the Committee explained its rationale for enacting the PDA:
The consequences of ... discriminatory employment policies on pregnant women
and women in general has historically had a persistent and harmful effect upon their
careers. Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women are marginal work-
ers. Until a woman passes the childbearing age, she is viewed by employers as poten-
tially pregnant. Therefore, the elimination of discrimination based on pregnancy in
these employment practices ... will go a long way toward providing equal employ-
ment opportunities for women, the goal of Title VII....
Id. at 4754-55.
Prior to enactment of the PDA, provision of pregnancy benefits to female employees was
a much disputed issue before the Supreme Court. In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974),
the Court held that a state law which excluded pregnancy from temporary disability bene-
fits did not violate equal protection. Two years later, the Court confirmed this holding in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), concluding that a disability plan which
covered all disabilities except those related to pregnancy did not violate Title VII. Then in
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), the Court upheld a disability policy which
excluded pregnant women from receiving disability benefits. Following these decisions, Con-
gress amended Title VII with the PDA. This amendment effectively overturned the deci-
sions in Geduldig, Gilbert, and Satty, and made explicit that employers must treat pregnant
employees the same as all other employees.
1992] 415
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pregnancy or reproductive health rule to be a "pretext for discrimination
on the basis of. . .gender."16
Notwithstanding its general prohibition on discrimination in the work-
place, Title VII provides a narrow defense for employers who breach its
provisions. An employer may legitimately discriminate on the basis of a
prohibited classification in "certain instances where religion, sex, or na-
tional origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.' 1 7 The
use of the words "certain," "normal,". "particular," and "occupational"
demonstrate that an objective, verifiable requirement concerned with job-
related skills is necessary to invoke the defense. 8 Furthermore, the PDA
includes its own bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") standard:
Unless pregnant workers differ "in their ability or inability to work, they
must be treated the same as other employees for all employment-related
purposes."'19
The employer has the burden of proving that its facially discriminatory
employment classification constitutes a BFOQ. For example, in a sex dis-
crimination suit, the employer bears the difficult burden of demonstrating
why it must use gender as a criterion in employment.2 1 In order to prevail
under the BFOQ exception, the employer must show a relationship be-
tween the individual's sex and his or her ability to perform the requisite
duties of the job. This narrow focus on job performance distinguishes the
16. Wendy W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of
Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 GEo. L.J. 641,
682 (1981). Professor Williams further noted:
[The PDA] provides that a pregnancy rule is never neutral, and that a neutral rule
... can be shown to be a pretext for discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and
hence gender. The plaintiff, therefore, need only show that the employer intended to
discriminate against pregnant or potentially pregnant women ... to prove pretext.
Id. at 682.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1988). The bona fide occupational qualification is a statu-
tory exception for disparate treatment cases filed under Title VII. See Vibiana M. Andrade,
The Toxic Workplace: Title VII Protection for the Potentially Pregnant Person, 4 HARv.
WOMEN's L.J. 71, 84 (1981).
For recent federal cases applying the BFOQ defense to geider-related issues, see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S.
400 (1985); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); EEOC v. J.M. Huber Corp., 942 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1991); Grant v.
General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990); Graves v. Women's Professional Rodeo
Assoc., Inc., 907 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1990); Chambers v. The Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 840 F.2d
583 (8th Cir. 1988); Rider v. Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982 (3rd Cir. 1988); Torres v. Wisconsin
Dept. of Health and Human Services, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988).
18. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1204 (1991), reu'g 886
F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
19. 111 S. Ct. at 1206 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
20. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989).
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BFOQ defense from the employer's other potential defense under Title
VII, the business necessity defense.
The business necessity defense, which would apply with a facially neu-
tral employment policy, imposes on the employee the burden of proving
the lack of business necessity while imposing upon the employer only the
burden of production.21 The employer's burden is met if it can show a
"manifest relationship" between the employment practice and job per-
formance. 22 Accordingly, the business necessity defense allows the em-
ployer to look beyond mere job performance and consider other factors
such as workplace safety or the protectibn of the work environment.2
3
Overall, the business necessity defense imposes a less demanding burden
on the employer than does the BFOQ defense.
The language found in both Title VII and the PDA demonstrates Con-
gress' intent that discrimination based on pregnancy or the ability to bear
children should constitute illegal sex discrimination.' 4 Only in narrow cir-
cumstances where gender is a BFOQ will this type of discrimination qual-
ify as a valid exception. It is also important to note that the narrow scope
of the BFOQ defense does not encompass paternalistic notions of male
and female roles.25 A fetal protection policy that excludes all fertile
women, regardless of their ability to perform the job, undermines Con-
gress' express intent to protect all women from sex discrimination in the
workplace. Moreover, this type of policy violates Title VII by failing to
serve legitimate employment objectives.
III. INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII AND THE PDA PRIOR TO JOHNSON
CONTROLS
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls, two United
States courts of appeals held that an employer could justify the exclusion
of women from certain jobs where their employment may endanger fetal
health. These courts focused on the threat of harm to an employee's prog-
eny instead of on the issue of the employee's job performance. This
change in focus signaled the courts' departure from the type of BFOQ
analysis Congress had intended the courts to apply.
21. Wards Cove Packing v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659-60 (1989).
22. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
23. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v.
Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 n.26 (4th Cir. 1982).
24. See supra text accompanying notes 11-20.
25. Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1370 n.20 (11th Cir. 1982) ("[t]he narrow scope
of the bfoq exception does not encompass perceptions of male and female roles based upon
romantic paternalism or the divine plan for the separation of the sexes"); see also Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (refusal to hire an individual on the basis of stereotyped
classifications of the sexes is prohibited by Title VII).
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A. The Fourth Circuit's Decision in Wright v. Olin Corporation"
In Wright v. Olin Corporation, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
examined a fetal protection policy entitled "Female Employment and Fe-
tal Vulnerability Policy."2 7 Olin had enacted a policy designed to protect
potential fetuses by excluding all fertile women from jobs that included
contact with toxic chemicals.2 This policy created three job classifica-
tions for female employees - "non-restricted," "controlled," and "re-
stricted" - based on the amount of their exposure to certain chemicals. 29
Because the "restricted" employment classification involved contact with
chemicals known to be harmful to fetuses, the company refused to place
any female employee in this classification unless the company's doctors
found that she was unable to bear children and that she would not suffer
adverse psychological effects from the work environment. 0 In contrast,
the company merely issued oral warnings to male employees about poten-
tial hazards from exposure to the same chemicals without restricting their
access to any part of the plant.-"
In addressing the effects of Olin's fetal protection policy, the Fourth
Circuit noted that Title VII permits an employer to defend an allegedly
discriminatory employment policy. If the policy is found to be facially
discriminatory, thus evidencing disparate treatment, the employer may
defend the policy only by showing that its BFOQ is essential to business
operations.32 The court recognized that this particular fetal protection
26. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
27. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1182-92.
28. Id. at 1182. The policy assumed that all women aged five to sixty-three were fertile.
Id.
29. Id.
30. The "controlled" employment classification required a female worker who was not
pregnant to sign a waiver acknowledging that her job involves "some risk, although slight."
Pregnant women were allowed to work in "controlled" jobs only on a case-by-case determi-
nation. The "non-restricted" employment classification allowed all women access to such
designated positions. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1184-85. A Title VII violation can be established under two different theories -
disparate treatment or disparate impact. In a case of disparate treatment,
[t]he employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment. ...
[On the other hand, a disparate impact claim] involve[s] employment practices that
are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more
harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity
... .Proof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required under a disparate impact
theory.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
The BFOQ is an affirmative defense to facially discriminatory employment practices (dis-
parate treatment); whereas the business necessity standard applies to employment practices
[Vol. 26:413
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policy was not essential to Olin's business operations, and thus could not
withstand the BFOQ inquiry.3
Concerned about the fetal health issue, however, the court held that
the overt discrimination/BFOQ analysis did not apply anyway. The court
was reluctant to require the employer to meet the standard of the BFOQ
defense since the narrow scope of this defense did not permit the em-
ployer to present the business necessity defense that it would be entitled
to assert under a disparate impact claim.3 4 Consequently, the court cate-
gorized the policy as "facially neutral" and proceeded to evaluate the pol-
icy in light of the disparate impact theory and the business necessity
defense.35
The court determined that Olin's policy constituted a prima facie viola-
tion of Title VII because the policy did have a disparate impact on
women. 3  Analogizing the fetus to an invitee "legitimately on business
premises" and exposed to any of its associated hazards, the court con-
cluded that the employer owed a duty of reasonable care to protect the
fetus.3 7 Accordingly, the Wright court ruled that Olin's fetal protection
policy could be justified as a business necessity.38
The Wright ruling reflected the belief that the goals behind the enact-
ment of Title VII and the PDA should not override an employer's safety
policy.3 9 Under the court's disparate impact analysis, the employees chal-
lenging Olin's policy could rebut the employer's showing of business ne-
cessity only by demonstrating a less discriminatory alternative. 0 The em-
ployees here were unable to establish an alternative policy. Thus, through
convoluted reasoning, the court allowed Olin's facially discriminatory fe-
tal protection policy to avoid the strict requirements of the BFOQ de-
fense. This holding set the stage for later confusion in analyzing fetal pro-
tection policies under Title VII.
with disparate impact. For a thorough explanation of disparate treatment, disparate impact,
the BFOQ defense, and the business necessity standard, see Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Re-
visited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to Intentional Sex Discrimi-
nation, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 4 (1991).
33. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185. The court declined to expand the narrow scope of the
BFOQ to include fetal protection policies because it felt this would be an intrusive exercise
of the court's power into the statutorily defined parameters of Title VII. Id. at 1185 n.21.
34. Id.; see supra note 32.
35. Wright, 697 F.2d at 1186. The court conceded that the facial neutrality requirement
for disparate impact analysis "might be subject to logical dispute," but also noted that this
type of analysis had previously been applied to similar policies "whose 'facial neutrality' was
only superficial." Id.
36. Id. at 1187.
37. Id. at 1189.
38. Id. at 1189-90.
39. Id. at 1189.
40. Id. at 1191.
1992]
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B. The Eleventh Circuit's Decision in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial
Hospital 4
1
In Hayes, an X-ray technician claimed that she had been fired because
of her pregnancy and that her termination violated Title VII and the
PDA.4 ' The Eleventh Circuit conceded that the policy under which Hayes
was fired was facially discriminatory. Nevertheless, the court noted that
Hayes' employer could have rebutted the presumption of discrimination
under the business necessity defense if the policy "effectively and equally
protect[ed] the offspring of all employees."4 If the hospital met this bur-
den of proof, Hayes could then prevail only if she could demonstrate an
effective alternative policy.4" Consequently, the hospital had to show that
a substantial risk of harm to the fetus existed in the work environment
and that the risk applied only to women.45 In this instance, the hospital
could not present evidence indicating a substantial risk of harm to the
fetus, and therefore, could not rebut the presumption of discrimination.
Thus, the hospital could not have raised the business necessity defense.46
Even though the Hayes court stated that it was deciding the case under
the overt discrimination/BFOQ theory, the court actually analyzed the
policy under the disparate impact theory. The court recognized the prob-
lem of asserting a business necessity defense in a fetal protection policy
case because the policy generally has no relation to an employee's actual
job performance. 47 The court swept this concern aside, however, in a foot-
note to its opinion: "[W]e simply recognize fetal protection as a legitimate
area of employer concern to which the business necessity defense ex-
tends. '48 The court offered no reason for this finding other than its desire
to promote a "higher public policy than simply protecting employers from
lawsuits." 49
Once again, by allowing an employer to invoke the more lenient busi-
ness necessity defense in support of its fetal protection policy, a federal
court had departed from applying the strict requirements of the BFOQ
41. 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984).
42. Id. at 1546.
43. Id. at 1548. The employer said that company doctors recommended Hayes be re-
moved from areas where radiation was used, and since alternative employment was not
available, her pregnancy was used as the reason for termination of employment. Since the
employer admitted Hayes was fired because she was pregnant, this policy decision was on
the basis of pregnancy, and thus sex, which violates Title VII. Id.
44. As one commentator has noted, there was no precedent for this type of analysis in
Title VII or the PDA, and the court's allowance of a rebuttable presumption of discrimina-
tion circtmvents the BFOQ defense. Naretto, supra note 13, at 463 n.161.
45. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548.
46. Id. at 1550-51.
47. Id. at 1552.
48. Id. at 1552 n.14.
49. Id. at 1553 n.15.
[Vol. 26:413
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defense. In doing so, the Hayes court misconstrued the BFOQ provision
by omitting the word "reasonably" from its application of Title VII's stat-
utory language.50 This misinterpretation not only undermined the effec-
tiveness of the BFOQ, but also carved out a narrower exception for the
BFOQ than Congress had intended. 51 Furthermore, the court ignored the
provisions of the PDA that prohibit policies applicable only to women. By
requiring an employer to defend the constitutionality of its fetal protec-
tion policy under the business necessity defense instead of the more strin-
gent BFOQ defense, the Hayes court allowed an employer a more lenient
defense for its discriminatory policy than can be reconciled with the man-
dates for equal employment rights found under Title VII and the PDA.52
C. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Following the Wright and Hayes decisions, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission ("EEOC") adopted guidelines for fetal protection
policies that essentially endorsed these circuit court holdings. The guide-
lines acknowledged that fetal protection policies constituted per se viola-
tions of Title VII to which the BFOQ defense usually applied. However,
the guidelines noted that fetal protection cases did not fit under the
traditional Title VII framework. In this class of cases, therefore, the busi-
ness necessity defense should be applied.5 3
By adopting the rationales given in Wright and Hayes, the EEOC al-
lowed employers more latitude in developing policies that discriminated
against women, The EEOC acted in the name of an underlying magnani-
mous purpose of fetal protection. Its latitude, as well as the courts' re-
fusal to apply the congressionally intended BFOQ analysis, took the teeth
out of the strict BFOQ requirements found in both Title VII and the
50. Id. at 1552. Sex discrimination is lawful under Title VII if sex is a BFOQ "reasonably.
necessary" to a business' normal operation. Marcelo L. Riffaud, Comment, Fetal Protection
and UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Job Openings for Barren Women Only, 58 FORDHAM L.
REv. 843, 854 n.72 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)l (1982)). Both the Hayes and the
Wright courts, however, omitted the word "reasonably" when referring to this Title VII
provision. See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549 ("the BFOQ defense is available only when the em-
ployer can show that the excluded class is unable to perform the duties that constitute the
essence of the job, duties that Title VII defines as 'necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business or enterprise.' "); Wright, 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21 ("[p]roperly applied,
this statutory defense is a narrow one ... under which a concededly discriminatory occupa-
tional qualification is shown ... to be 'necessary to the essence of [the] business'" (cita-
tions omitted)).
51. Riffaud, supra note 50, at 854 n.72.
52. Naretto, supra note 13, at 457.
53. Policy Statement on Reproductive and Fetal Hazards Under Title VII [October 3,
1988] Fair Equal Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 401:6013 ("in this narrow class of cases, [the
business necessity defense] should be flexibly applied"), quoted in Howard A. Simon, Fetal
Protection Policies after Johnson Controls: No Easy Answers, 15 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 491,
498 (1990).
1992]
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PDA prohibiting discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. This judicial
and administrative misapplication of law would continue for seven years
until International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
IV. INTERNATIONAL UNION V. JOHNSON CONTROLS, INC.54
A. The Lower Courts
In 1982, Johnson Controls, Inc. ("Johnson Controls") operated fourteen
plants that manufactured batteries with lead components." In that year,
the company promulgated a fetal protection policy prohibiting all women
of childbearing age from working in jobs where their exposure to lead
would exceed the level considered safe for children by the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control.56 In 1984, International Union filed a class-action
suit in the federal court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on behalf of
"all past, present and future production and maintenance employees em-
ployed in bargaining units represented by the International Union. . . at
[Johnson Controls'] Battery Division plants. . . who [had] been and con-
tinue[d] to be affected by [Johnson Controls'] Fetal Protection Policy. '5
The complaint alleged that the policy discriminated against men and
women in violation of Title VII. Johnson Controls moved for summary
judgment.5 8
In granting Johnson Controls' motion, the court focused only on two
issues: first, whether there was a significant risk of harm to the fetus from
exposure to lead; and second, whether the risk was substantially confined
to the offspring of women.59 After reviewing the testimony of experts and
the precedent established by Wright and Hayes, the district court
concluded:
Society has an interest in protecting fetal safety. Lead poses a substantial
risk of harm to the fetus. This risk is born only by women who are pregnant
or will become pregnant. The plaintiffs have not shown that there is an ac-
ceptable alternative that would have a lesser impact on females.65
54. 680 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Wis. 1988), affd, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
1196 (1991).
55. 680 F. Supp. at 309, 310.
56. Id.; see also Simon, supra note 53, at 499. Johnson Controls' policy stated "that
women who are pregnant or who are capable of bearing children will not be placed into jobs
involving lead exposure or which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job
bidding, bumping, transfer or promotion rights."
111 S. Ct. at 1200 (citation omitted).
57. Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 310.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 310.
60. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
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The court also summarily dismissed the need to undertake a BFOQ anal-
ysis by stating: "Because of the fetuses [sic] possibility of unknown exis-
tence to the mother and the severe risk of harm that may occur if ex-
posed to lead, the fetal protection policy is not facially discriminatory."'"
These explanations demonstrate the court's view that the risk to fe-
tuses, whether they be in-utero or potential, overrides a woman's interest
in equal employment opportunity. This conclusion reflects a paternalistic
attitude that, because only women become pregnant and may sometimes
not know of the pregnancy, the employer, or the court, is in a better posi-
tion than the woman to look after the interests of her unborn child.
On appeal,6 2 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had only a limited
record from the district court to review because summary judgment had
been granted. The Seventh Circuit, not surprisingly, cited Wright, Hayes
and the EEOC guidelines in'support of its own analysis of fetal protection
policies under the disparate impact scheme.6 3 The court concluded that,
since Title VII allows an employer to enact policies which protect em-
ployees' health and safety, proof of a "substantial health risk to the un-
born child" would justify establishing a fetal protection policy.6 4 In addi-
tion, the court accepted the testimony of Johnson Controls' expert which
indicated that women were adversely affected by exposure to lead. But,
the court rejected as "speculative and unconvincing" the evidence
presented by the employees' expert which demonstrated that exposure to
lead posed an unhealthy risk to both males and females.6 5 Consequently,
the court held that the employees failed to prove that the risk affected
male employees as well as female employees.6 Although the employees
had presented alternatives to Johnson Controls' policy, the court declined
to substitute its judgment for the employer's and rejected the alternatives
as not feasible.6 7
The Seventh Circuit also analyzed the case under the BFOQ scheme.6,
Relying upon its previous decision in Torres v. Wisconsin Department of
61. Id. at 316 (footnote omitted). "
62. International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 886.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 889. It is interesting to note that the court accepted expert testimony offered by
Johnson Controls even though that testimony made no mention of how lead affected men.
The experts whose studies were accepted by the court issued a statement to the effect that
they did not test men but their "studies were based solely on the reproductive effects in
women," and lead's reproductive effects were not limited to women. Naretto, supra note 13,
at 467 n.185.
66. 886 F.2d at 890.
67. Naretto, supra note 13, at 467. Alternatives offered included using different manufac-
turing procedures, excluding only women who were actually pregnant, and lowering employ-
ees' lead levels. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 892.
68. 886 F.2d at 893.
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Health and Social Services,"9 the court accepted Johnson Controls' fetal
protection policy as an essential safety measure necessary to operate the
business.70 In reviewing the research concerning the hazardous effects of
exposure to lead, the court stated that the primary risk for fertile women
involved the transmission of lead to a fetus; interestingly, the court made
no such reference to the risk of lead transmission to the fetus through
sperm.7 1 On this basis, the court held that employing women in jobs with
exposure to lead would undermine the operation of the business.
2
The court conceded that in the "usual case" a suggestion that a job
may be "too dangerous for a woman" could be met with the response that
"it is the purpose of Title VII to allow the individual woman to make the
choice for herself. 7 3 The "usual case" scenario, however, did not apply
here because more was at risk "than an individual woman's decision to
weigh and accept the risks of employment. '7 4 The court, therefore, deter-
mined that Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy withstood the BFOQ
defense requirement of business necessity. With this decision, the Sev-
enth Circuit became the first court of appeals to hold that a sex-specific
fetal protection policy could qualify as a BFOQ.
Four of the eleven judges dissented from the majority opinion, contend-
ing that Johnson Controls' policy constituted overt sex discrimination
that could only be justified with the BFOQ defense.7 5 In one of the dis-
senting opinions, Judge Posner suggested that the majority along with
other circuit courts had "stitch[ed] a new defense expressly for fetal pro-
tection cases" because they had concluded that the policies would not
prevail under the BFOQ analysis.76 Judge Easterbrook's dissent, joined by
Judge Flaum, was more far-reaching. First, he chastised the majority for
69. 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988). Torres involved the issue of whether men could be
employed as guards in a women's prison. The court upheld the exclusion of men under the
BFOQ defense on the ground that Congress would have allowed the defense in recognition
of the differences between men and women. Id. at 1527-28.
70. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 898.
71. Id. at 897-99. This was an erroneous oversight given scientific evidence available at
the time. See infra text accompanying notes 99-101.
72. 886 F.2d at 898 ("[G]iven the reasonable objectives of the employer, the very woman-
hood ... of the employee undermines her capacity to perform a job satisfactorily.") (cita-
tions omitted).
73. Id. at 897 (emphasis in original) (quoting Dothard v. Rawlingson, 433 U.S. 321, 333
(1977)).
74. Id. (citations omitted). The court further stated that "it would not be improbable that
a female employee might somehow rationally discount this clear risk .. " Id. This state-
ment suggests the court's belief that women may be incapable of adequately considering the
effects a job may have on their offspring when exercising employment rights protected by
Title VII and the PDA. Once again, this paternalistic attitude inhibited a federal court's
ability to implement clear statutory requirements.
. 75. Id. at 901-02 (Cudahy, J., dissenting), 903-04 (Posner, J., dissenting), 908 (Easter-
brook, J., and joined by Flaum, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 903 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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essentially holding that Johnson Controls "must [have been] a disparate
impact case because an employer couldn't win it as a disparate treatment
case.1 7 Second, he concluded that Johnson Controls' fetal protection pol-
icy would not qualify as a BFOQ because the objective of such a policy -
concern for unborn children - is unrelated either to the business of bat-
tery-making or to a woman's ability to make batteries. 78 Finally, he ex-
pressed concern that the majority's opinion might "consign more women
to 'women's work' while reserving better-paying but more hazardous jobs
for men."7 9
Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Johnson Controls, the
EEOC issued a policy response advocating a BFOQ analysis for fetal pro-
tection policies.80 The EEOC did not, however, proceed to adopt Judge
Easterbrook's position regarding the standard to be applied under the
BFOQ analysis. In fact, the revised guidelines were virtually identical to
the business necessity test from the initial guidelines.8 1 The EEOC's new
policy required employers to show "stringent and detailed" proof of a
BFOQ, but not at the level traditionally required of this defense."2 Addi-
tionally, the EEOC's policy allowed employers to consider the health and
safety of unborn children as part of the business, an essential component
for establishing a BFOQ. 3
The circuit court's decision in Johnson Controls marked the third time
that a federal court had allowed an employer to retain a facially discrimi-
natory fetal protection policy under the lenient business necessity de-
fense.8 4 Thus, the mandates of Title VII and the PDA had once again
been undermined and were effectively avoided until the Supreme Court
reviewed Johnson Controls on appeal.
B. The Supreme Court
In granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court stated that its
goal was "to resolve the obvious conflict between the Fourth, Seventh,
and Eleventh Circuits on this issue, and to address the important and
77. Id. at 910 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
78. Id. at 912.
79. Id. at 920.
80. EEOC Guidelines on Seventh Circuit Decision in United Auto Workers v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., [January 24, 1990] 18 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Jan. 26, 1990).
81. See Simon, supra note 53, at 505-06. The revised guidelines provided: "In short,
whether one applies the BFOQ or the 'business necessity' analysis as discussed in the [initial
guidelines], the burden is on the employer to justify its policy." Id. at 506 (quoting EEOC
Guidelines on Seventh Circuit Decision in United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
[January 24, 1990] 18 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Jan. 26, 1990)).
82. Id. at 506.
83. Id. at 507.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 26-52.
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difficult question whether an employer, seeking to protect potential fe-
tuses, may discriminate against women just because of their ability to be-
come pregnant." 85
During oral arguments before the Court, the attorney for the employees
asserted that a fetal protection policy such as the one initiated by John-
son Controls would "cut the heart out" of Title VII and the PDA.8 She
warned that the policy would oust women from factories and impose a
"stigmatic harm" on them by broadcasting throughout the workforce who
is or is not fertile."' Not surprisingly, the attorney for Johnson Controls
argued that the policy fell within the BFOQ defense because it was rea-
sonably necessary "to the business' safe operation."88 Justice O'Connor's
response foreshadowed what would be the Court's approach in analyzing
this issue: "It seems to me you're not coming to grips with the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act."8 9 Justice O'Connor further suggested that the
Court's previous holding in Dothard v. Rawlinson9 stood for the proposi-
tion that concerns for safety do not support a BFOQ defense. 1
Declaring that Title VII and the PDA prohibit fetal protection policies
aimed only at one sex, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
Seventh Circuit's holding in Johnson Controls.92 The Court noted that
the company's policy was obviously biased against women because it gave
only men the choice of risking reproductive health for a certain job.
Moreover, because Johnson Controls' policy applied to women on the ba-
sis of childbearing capacity, not just fertility, the Court held that the pol-
icy was facially discriminatory. Unless the policy could be defended as a
BFOQ, it constituted the type of sex-based discrimination forbidden by
Title VII.93
Addressing the scope of the BFOQ, the Court reiterated the narrow
reading that this defense had previously been given with regard to dis-
crimination.94 Referring to the concurring opinion's emphasis on cost and
85. 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1202 (1991) (footnote omitted).
86. Arguments Before the Court, 59 U.S.L.W. 3304 (Oct. 23, 1990).
87. Id. at 3305.
88. Id. at 3304.
89. Id. at 3305.
90. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
91. 59 U.S.L.W. at 3305. Justice Scalia stated that Johnson Controls was making "a farce
out of the [PDA]" and sarcastically asked if management could create a work rule to pre-
vent pregnant women from working long hours because it may negatively affect the fetus.
He commented that "the health of the fetus is a judgment left up to the mother." Id.
92. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209-10.
93. Id. at 1202-03.
94. Id. at 1204; see Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122-25 (1985);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977).
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safety instead of the "essence of the business" requirement for the
BFOQ,95 the Court stated:
The unconceived fetuses of Johnson Controls' female employees, however,
are neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essential to the busi-
ness of battery manufacturing. No one can disregard the possibility of in-
jury to future children; the BFOQ, however, is not so broad that it trans-
forms this deep social concern into an essential aspect of batterymaking.
. . . [T]he safety exception is limited to instances in which sex or preg-
nancy actually interferes with the employee's ability to perform the
job. . . . Johnson Controls suggests, however, that we expand the exception
to allow fetal-protection policies that mandate particular standards for
pregnant or fertile women. We decline to do so. Such an expansion contra-
dicts not only the language of the BFOQ and the narrowness of its excep-
tion but the plain language and history of the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act."
95. The majority and concurring opinions disagreed as to the potential tort liability that
an employer may face without a sex-specific fetal protection policy. The majority stated:
Without negligence, it would be difficult, for a court to find liability on the part of the
employer. If, under general tort principles, Title VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection
policies, the employer fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not
acted negligently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at best.
111 S. Ct. at 1208.
Furthermore, the majority dismissed as unpersuasive the tort liability argument that it
would cost the employer more to hire fertile women. Noting that Congress considered the
cost of treating pregnancy and related conditions equally under the PDA but decided to
forbid discrimination "despite the social costs associated therewith," the majority held that
discrimination against fertile women could not be justified by the "incremental cost of hir-
ing women." Id. at 1209.
In contrast, the concurring opinions expressed skepticism of the majority's view of poten-
tial tort liability. Id. at 1210-11 (White, J., concurring), 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
White wrote:
[A] fetal protection policy would be justified under the terms of the statute if, for
example, an employer could show that exclusion of women from certain jobs was rea-
sonably necessary to avoid substantial tort liability. Common sense tells us that it is
part of the normal operation of business concerns to avoid causing injury to third
parties... if for no other reason than to avoid tort liability and its substantial costs.
Id. at 1210.
Justice White went on to discuss three potential problems with the majority's optimism as
to employer liability. First, compliance with Title VII may not preempt state tort law. Sec-
ond, warnings to employees would not necessarily preclude tort claims by the children since
parents cannot generally waive their children's claims. And third, negligence may be difficult
for employers to determine since compliance with OSHA standards may not be a defense to
state tort liability. Id. at 1211.
This disagreement will most likely foster lively debate among legal scholars as they sort
out the compelling arguments presented by both the majority and concurring opinions.
96. Id. at 1206. The Court noted that the legislative history of the PDA confirms what the
language of this legislation requires:
Under this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must focus
not on their condition alone but on the actual effects of that condition on their ability
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The Court concluded that the language of Title VII and the PDA pro-
hibited "an employer from discriminating against a woman because of her
capacity to become pregnant unless her reproductive potential pre-
vent[ed] her from performing the duties of her job." The Court further
ruled that "[d]ecisions about the welfare of future children must be left
to the parents who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to
the employers who hire those parents. . . .Title VII and the PDA simply
do not allow a woman's dismissal because of her failure to submit to
sterilization.
s9 7
With these few concise statements, the Supreme Court put the teeth
back into the BFOQ requirement of Title VII and the PDA.
V. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF JOHNSON CONTROLS
According to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
("OSHA"), at least 835,000 employees are covered by its Standard for
Exposure to Lead."8 This fact is important to note in considering the
magnitude of danger presented by exposure to lead. The reproductive ef-
fects of lead exposure include: increased rates of miscarriage and still-
birth for women directly exposed to lead and for wives of men who were
to work. Pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the
same conditions as other employees....
Id. at 1206-07 (quoting AMENDING TITLE VII, CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1964, S. REP. No. 95-331,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 4-6 (1977)). "With the PDA, Congress made clear that the decision to
become pregnant or to work while being either pregnant or capable of becoming pregnant
was reserved for each individual woman to make for herself." Id. at 1207.
97. Id. at 1207. In a footnote to this section the Court states: "We have never addressed
privacy-based discrimination and shall not do so here because the sex-based discrimination
at issue today does not involve the privacy interests of Johnson Controls' customers. Noth-
ing in our discussion of the 'essence of the business test,' however, suggests that sex could
not constitute a BFOQ when privacy interests are implicated." Id. at 1207 n.4 (citation
omitted).
These statements set up a interesting potential scenario. Suppose a company promulgates
a fetal protection policy which applies equally to men and women. This hypothetical policy
would require that upon deciding to start a family, or upon learning of a pregnancy, an
employee would be automatically transferred to a job with less risk. A female employee is
then found to be pregnant but does not want to transfer, and offers to consider having an
abortion instead. If the company transfers the woman anyway, citing the need to avoid tort
liability to the unborn child (a justifiable standard under Justice White's concurrence, see
id. at 1210), could the company invoke the BFOQ defense should the woman claim a viola-
tion of Title VII and the PDA?
The Court has recognized a woman's privacy interest in deciding to have an abortion, see
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), yet has failed to strike down a statute recognizing that
fetuses have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being which may override a wo-
man's abortion rights. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
These decisions do not suggest a clear answer to the hypothetical proposed above.
98. Williams, supra note 16, at 647 (citing OSHA News, 6 JoB SAFETY AND HEALTH 2 (Dec.
1978)).
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exposed; reduced male fertility and increased sperm abnormalities; and
suspected genetic damage through lead's mutagen capabilities which af-
fects both men and women." Furthermore, animal tests have shown that
lead is capable of crossing the placental barrier and entering the blood
and tissue of the fetus, and may be capable of causing birth defects be-
cause of this exposure.'00 Until the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson
Controls, this type of evidence was presented in cases challenging fetal
protection policies but was dismissed as insufficient. This type of evi-
dence may now provoke changes in the workplace to reduce exposure to
lead for both men and women, instead of exclusionary policies aimed only
at women. As one commentator has noted, "[c]oncern for female repro-
ductive capacity and the fetus is praiseworthy, but experience is demon-
strating that any given substance may be equally damaging to the male
reproductive system and, through the male, to the fetus."'' 1
By striking down Johnson Controls' policy, the Supreme Court has pro-
vided ammunition to attack paternalistic attitudes towards women in the
workplace. 102 For too many years employers have enacted special labor
practices aimed only at women under the guise of protecting them from
job hazards, when in fact, these exclusionary policies only rationalized the
resulting discrimination. Fetal protection policies have been promulgated
under the "myth of perpetual pregnancy" where every woman is pre-
sumed pregnant unless proven otherwise. 03 This myth allows men to con-
sider as reasonable a presumption that, because a woman is not capable
of choosing pregnancy, she should not be permitted to choose whether or
not to work in a job with risks to her reproductive health.
The fact that employers have presented, and courts have accepted, evi-
dence showing only the risks associated with a woman's exposure to lead
makes it easier for companies to justify instituting paternalistic exclu-
sidnary policies instead of expending the necessary resources to clean up
the work environment for all employees.' However, as the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stated in Hardin v. Stynchcomb, "the narrow scope of the [BFOQ]
exception does not encompass perceptions of male and female roles based
99. MARY GIBsoN, WORKERS' RIGHTS 8 (1983).
100. Id.
101. Letter from Eula Bingham, former Assistant Secretary of Labor, to corporate medi-
cal directors (May 1, 1978) (quoted in Williams, supra note 16, at 663).
102. A standard characterization of paternalism can be found in the following statement:
"By paternalism I shall understand roughly the interference with a person's liberty of action
justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or
values of the person being coerced." RONALD DWORKIN, PATERNALISM 108 (1971) (quoted in
GIBSON, supra note 99, at 15).
103. GIBSON, supra note 99, at 20.
104. Id.
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upon romantic paternalism or the divine plan for the separation of the
sexes."
0 5
Following the decision in Johnson Controls, employers may no longer
justify fetal protection policies applicable only to women. The Supreme
Court has explicitly stated that Title VII and the PDA together establish
a federal policy favoring equal employment opportunity such that any
policy an employer might choose to create must be applied equally to
women and men unless unequal jeopardy can be clearly proven.0'0 The
resulting requirement that employers meet the stringent BFOQ defense
should deter the implementation of arbitrary policies that blatantly dis-
criminate against women.' It should also force employers to implement
nondiscriminatory measures to lessen the fetal risks already acknowl-
edged through fetal protection policies.
The importance of the Johnson Controls decision cannot be- overstated.
Women constitute more than half of the population of the United States.
To treat a threat to this substantial portion of the population as a special
vulnerability of the individual worker, but not the responsibility or con-
cern of employers and society, is unacceptable and unjust.0 8 As one col-
umnist explained,
[i]n consideration of women's right to equal employment opportunity and
the practical necessity of work for many women, Congress expressly en-
dorsed the proposition that no woman should have to sacrifice the right to
work in order to have a family, nor sacrifice the right to have a family in
order to work. Title VII and other civil rights measures brought these
women the promise of such employment. 09
Had the Supreme Court upheld Johnson Controls' fetal protection pol-
icy, widespread acceptance of the practice of employing only infertile
women might have led to the development of a "subclass of 'drones' in
105. 691 F.2d 1364, 1370 n.20 (4th Cir. 1982).
106. An employer who creates a gender-neutral policy may find that a substance in the
workplace does, in fact, affect only women and their fetuses. With respect to that substance,
the employer could apply a facially-neutral policy only to affected workers without violating
Title VII and the PDA. However, the employer would still have to show that the policy was
narrowly tailored and no adequate alternative existed. Williams, supra note 16, at 667; see
also Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1213 (White, J., concurring) ("an employer could estab-
lish a BFOQ defense by showing that all or substantially all women would be unable to
perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved") (emphasis added in original)
(citation omitted).
107. Naretto, supra note 13, at 469.
108. GIBSON, supra note 99, at 21. Gibson further notes that one rationalization for exclu-
sionary policies aimed at women is that by barring women from certain jobs employers and
society are showing concern and exercising responsibility. But the exclusion puts the entire
burden on those excluded without any choice as to how that burden will be carried. Id. at
21-22.
109. Moss, supra note 1, at 14.
[Vol. 26:413
JOHNSON CONTROLS
society."1 ' Or perhaps, it could have led to a "Catch-22" situation offer-
ing economic incentives for women to sacrifice ever having children, and,
in other words, to give up a physical and mental part of themselves in
order to gain the monetary benefits of employmerit. 11'
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls stands for the pro-
position that sex-specific fetal protection policies cannot be justified.
Companies must make the workplace as safe as possible for everyone,
fully inform all employees of the risks involved with the job, and allow
individual employees to make the final decision whether the risks are ac-
ceptable for themselves and their unborn children. As the Court recog-
nized, "It is no more appropriate for the courts than it is for individual
employers to decide whether a woman's reproductive role is more impor-
tant to herself and her family than her economic role. Congress has left
this choice to the woman as hers to make."
1 2
When parents make decisions for their children, there is a strong pre-
sumption that they are acting in the child's best interest. i3 The Supreme
Court has given credence to this presumption by expressing trust in an
employee's ability to make mature decisions in the area of fetal protec-
tion. Furthermore, the Court has reaffirmed that Title VII and the PDA
forbid sex-specific fetal-protection policies that do not meet the BFOQ
defense requirement. Essentially, with its holding in Johnson Controls,
the Supreme Court has reinforced that this legislation "means what it
says."' 4
M. Chris Floyd
110. GIBSON, supra note 99, at 142 n.11.
111. Patricia Williams, Fetal Fictions: An Exploration of Property Archetypes in Racial
and Gendered Contexts, 42 FLA. L. REv. 81, 89 (1990). The author notes that this situation
arises mostly with poor women of color who are forced into a system of passively bargained
for, privatized eugenics that are controlled by the corporation's business interest. Id.
112. International Union v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 1210 (1991).
113. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal
Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 30 (1987).
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
114. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1210.
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